Hassan Beheshtipour

Hassan Rohani has been declared the winner of the June 14 presidential election with 50.7 percent of the vote in an election which saw 72.7 percent voter turnout.

Out of 36,704,156 votes cast in the election, Rohani secured 18,613,329 votes, according to Interior Ministry’s tally. The outcome of this election was largely different from previous ones’. To analyze this historic event, the following points are highlighted.

Election result analysis

1. The election of Mr Rohani by the majority of voters was unexpected for most analysts who insisted that the Islamic Republic had engineered the elections either through the Guardian Council or vote arrangement. The unexpected results of this election proved all such speculation wrong.

2. In this election, the integrity of the Islamic Republic in counting the votes was another portrayal of national authority to the world.

3. Restoring national credibility which had been undermined due to the problems created by the 2009 election was one of the biggest achievements of this election which saw the victory of the current administration’s rival candidate.

4. The acceptable behavior and performance of the Ahmadinejad Administration in holding an astonishing election at a time when Esfandiyar Rahim-Mashaei, the main candidate of the administration, had been disqualified is undoubtedly an important step towards a good ending for the administration who was repeatedly accused of trying to adopt unconventional positions and disrupt the healthy election competition environment in favor of the disqualified candidate. But everyone saw that such baseless accusations are merely helping create a security atmosphere in the elections and the baselessness of such accusations was proven.

5. Mr. Rohani’s success in winning over the majority of the voters in the last week of the campaigning is on one hand because of the sacrifice of former First Vice President Mohammad Reza Aref who withdrew from the race in favor of Rohani after referencing former President Mohammad Khatami’s letter so that the vote would not be divided. On the other hand, the convergence of Khatami and Rafsanjani created a strong union of all moderate tendencies including reformists and moderationists in support of Rohani. Such strong support prepared the grounds and gained the trust of the majority of participants in the 2013 election to vote Rohani.

6. Principlist candidates made the same mistakes as the reformists in the 2005 election. In that year, reformists who believed they were unrivalled power refrained from forming a coalition among themselves and the Executives of Construction who supported Rafsanjani. Therefore due to divided vote among reformist candidates, Mr. Ahmadinejad reached the second round and in the end managed to defeat Rafsanjani and become the 6th Iranian president. In this election, it was the principlists who made a historic miscalculation and instead of unifying Tehran Mayor Mohammad-Baqer Qalibaf, chief nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili and former Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati, competed against one another. Therefore, the total votes of these three added was 12.5 million. But if they had united the elections would have reached a runoff stage.

7. Qalibaf, whose bid had come to an end after the first round of election in 2005, had had eight years to prepare for the vote. But he failed to draw the votes of the majority of people and the elite. The vote of the elites was important in this round because in recent years they have learning towards the reformists. In previous elections, the elites had shown that in the shortest period of time they could create election waves. Mr Qalibaf failed to woo the people. And despite his brilliant track record, the positions he adopted in the televised debates left a negative impression on the people which could not be erased even with a documentary-style campaign film.

8. Velayati, a seasoned Iranian diplomat, could not make up for going back on his promise to people to quit the race and accept the results of opinion polls in favor of Qalibaf and former Majlis Speaker Gholam-Ali Haddad-Adel. Perhaps he decided to remain in the race due to pressure or miscalculation, a decision that saw him come in fifth place among six candidates which in itself is a lesson for the principlists to learn to deliver on their promises.

9. Rezaei’s votes in this election greatly increased compared to last elections and this is considered a victory for him, but seeing that his votes were less than a person like Jalili who was running for president for the first time was a clear message for this wartime commander that the people do not trust managers who have yet to enter the modern executive and management arena. They cannot trust an individual who has not had experience as a minister or deputy minister in the past two decades. Perhaps Rezaei and Qalibaf will find positions in the interior or economy ministries in Rohani’s administration so that they will have enough executive experience at the highest levels over the next four years.

10. Mr Jalili managed to win the people’s votes with the Islamic Revolution discourse – people who could accept that one can have revolutionary management while safeguarding the principle values of the Islamic Revolution. Evidently, most voters had not reached this understanding that his limited six-year experience as Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council will cause him to be successful on this path.

11. Mr Gharazi, the last candidate, learned that the people need politicians and technocrats who can attract competent and committed to the people managers more than individuals who are good at critiquing the past.

Conclusion

The 11th presidential election in Iran made history and is a focal point in religious democracy in the history of the Islamic Revolution. Moderationists took the reign of the affairs to form a transfactional, rational and team-oriented administration.

 

Behzad Ahmadi Lafuraki

Director of international relations at Tehran International Studies & Research Institute

Introduction

During the recent days two important developments have taken place within the European Union (EU) with regard to the ongoing crisis in Syria. The first development was the failure of the foreign ministers of EU member states during their meeting in the Belgian capital, Brussels, on May 27, 2013, to reach an agreement on the extension of a ban on sending weapons to Syria militants. As a result of their failure, the embargo on sending arms to the foreign-backed militants in Syria was automatically revoked. The second development was a concerted effort launched by the UK and France in order to document the use of the nerve gas, sarin, by the government of Syria against the foreign-backed militants and send the relevant documents to the United Nations. Both the above developments are important for various reasons. The first development is of significance because it paves the way for the dispatch of heavy weapons to Syria militants by the European countries and also gives legitimacy to the efforts made by the governments of France and UK in this regard. The second development is aimed at showing the international community that the government of the incumbent Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad has already crossed the red line set for it by the United States and Britain. The natural outcome of both measures is increased possibility of a military strike against Syria by certain members of the European Union, led by France and Britain. Regardless of the nature and dimensions of that possible military intervention, the question which arises here is how probable such an attack could be? If the intervention actually takes place, what part will be played in it by the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)? And is the EU basically capable of launching military intervention against countries around it without support from the United States? If, by any chance, such an intervention is undertaken, would the EU be able to tolerate and manage its consequences? The rest of this article will make an effort to give answers to these questions through analysis of the EU’s relations with the United States within the framework of NATO.

“Financial crisis” and “Pivot to Asia” Achilles’ heel of trans-Atlantic relations

Since the end of the Cold War period, the margin of difference between the United States’ military power and that of its European allies has gradually but steadily increased. At present, the United States spends as much as 4.7 percent of its gross domestic product (GDP) on defense expenses while the corresponding figure for most other member states of NATO is less than 2 percent of their GDPs. Although the American officials have at times taken the European states to task for the existing difference between the two sides’ military expenses and low defense budget of most European countries, that criticism was not very substantial for either side. However, at present, there are three reasons which explain why the issue of divvying up the costs and responsibility of NATO operations as well as the rift between the United States and Europe in this regard has become more important compared to the past. The first reason includes growing threats faced by the United States which are no more of European origin and NATO members cannot be of any effective assistance to the United States in its effort to eliminate such emerging threats. The second reason is that the US Army is no longer in need of launching wars of coalition in view of its great advances and experiences it has gained through various wars. The situation has changed so strikingly that working with the past allies has become even cumbersome for the United States Army. The third and more important reason, however, is that the economic austerity policies are being taken more seriously, not only in Europe, but also in the United States, and it takes a lot of time to implement all of them. Therefore, the United States is especially determined to reduce its unnecessary, but costly military responsibilities in Europe and prevent the European countries from having a good time at the expense of Washington. The behavior of the European countries has been influential in this regard because gradual reduction in their defense budget has prompted the United States to take retaliatory measures.

The final result of these differences came to the surface in Libya. In fact, NATO operations in Libya opened a new chapter in the life of this organization, which showed to the world that it is quite possible for the United States not to take the lead in military operations of the alliance and, like many other member states, stay out of the direct conflict by providing collateral assistance and operational logistics. In other words, the war on Libya clearly proved that the role of the United States within NATO is changing from its previously leading position because the United States is no more willing to take the lead in any military operations and limits its engagement to the level that is necessary to prevent the failure of its allies.

In addition to reducing its military role, the United States has been also toning down its diplomatic involvement in various regional crises. During the political crises in Libya, [the West African country of] Mali, and Syria, although the United States has been still playing the part of a key partner, it has not appeared as a political and strategic leader anymore. As a result, the role played by France and the UK in strengthening defense and security policies of the European Union has been on the rise and these two countries are expected to set out the general layout of any future operations. However, there is no guarantee that even France and the UK will assume the leadership of all future operations of NATO in areas located in the periphery of Europe, but due to operational differences and political distinctions among those operations, every military operation may have its own leader.

In addition to reducing military and diplomatic role of the United States, there is another important factor at work in the form of the rising military power of Russia. In fact, the Europe is getting increasingly involved in developments in its periphery at a time that its defense budget is seeing drastic cuts, on the one hand, while Russia’s military power is steadily on the rise, on the other hand. This means that Europe is not powerful enough to get engaged in anther conflict in Syria and is more trying to reserve its military forces and resources for the rainy day when it would need them to confront the aforesaid Russian factor. European countries will also need such reserves for the purchase of unmanned aerial vehicles, exchange of information, as well as the establishment of operational and telecommunication centers.

Conclusion

The ongoing crisis in Syria clearly proves that the European Union has not yet found a correct answer to the question about its reaction to such crises as the one in Syria and how it is planning to overcome challenges that emanate from these crises. The following points, however, seem to be self-evident:

1. As a result of the ongoing economic crisis in Syria and the shift in global power, the European defense policy is facing fundamental changes as big as the changes it underwent at the end of the Cold War period. The US President Barack Obama’s reluctance about going on with Washington’s interventionist policy of the past in addition to the European Union’s inability to rein in the euro crisis have further increased the impact and extent of these changes. As a result, the trans-Atlantic alliance as well as the European Union’s collective and national defense policies are changing. The change is still in the offing. As the US presence in Asia becomes more pronounced, NATO will gradually turn into a regional military organization missioned to defend the European countries and, in a best-case scenario, to also defend countries close to Europe. As a result, the role of the European countries in future operations of NATO will be equivalent or even bigger than that of the United States.

2. The inability of the European Union foreign ministers to take a decision on the extension of the Union’s arms ban against the foreign-sponsored militants in Syria and the subsequent automatic revocation of the arms embargo, is indicative of the absence of unanimity among the European Union member states when it comes to their common foreign and security policy, and especially the EU’s common defense and security policy.

3. The experience gained in past years clearly proves that the European Union has never been able to win a war without help from the United States. Therefore, at a time that NATO and the United States are showing no interest in getting involved in military intervention in Syria, it is very unlikely that the European countries would reach a decision of their own to start such an intervention. However, the ongoing moves by France and the UK and their use of regional leverages at their disposal should not be ignored in this regard.

*Behzad Ahmadi Lafuraki is the director of international relations at Tehran International Studies & Research Institute and analyst of EU and NATO affairs.

Mahmoud Reza Golshanpazhooh
Executive Editor of Iran Review.Org

 

As was expected, Iranian people created a new epic event through their massive turnout in presidential election on Friday. Although most analysts speculated before the election that as a result of inconclusive votes won by candidates, there would be a runoff, the final result clearly proved that Mr. Hassan Rouhani had won an absolute majority of the votes as a result of which the presidential poll reached the finish line in the first stage. I had already mentioned a number of important points about the presidential election in Iran in my previous article . Here are a few more notes on this issue:

1. Although some analysts are trying to argue that the vote for Mr. Hassan Rouhani was, in fact, a negative vote to the Islamic establishment’s policies, it was, in reality, a vote to moderation and foresight. These two concepts were major components of Mr. Rouhani’s election campaign as well. The high vote garnered by Mr. Rouhani was the result of the collective effect of a number of variables as follows:

- His fair – and at the same time categorical – criticism of certain policies followed by the incumbent administration;

- His finesse in defending his own viewpoints, track records, and policies in televised debates, especially in the second and third debates;

- The full and all-out support provided to Mr. Rouhani by former presidents, Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and Mohammad Khatami;

- The smart move by the other reformist candidate, Mohammad Reza Aref, in withdrawing his presidential bid without declaring his official support for Mr. Rouhani. As a result, the clear demarcation between Mr. Aref’s purely reformist attitude and Mr. Rouhani’s moderate views was maintained;

- Increased political understanding on the part of the Iranian people as they were well aware that they could only play a crucial part in determining their own fate through participating in the political process, not by boycotting it;

- The great effort made by Mr. Rouhani and his election campaign to carefully observe the rules of the political game and their clear commitment to pursuing any possible protests to election process through legal channels as specified by the Iranian Constitution. This was very important because it redirected the votes of the mostly traditional sectors of the Iranian society toward him as they were afraid that voting for the reformists would only increase conflicts and tension in the society.

- Another important factor was the clerical nature of Mr. Rouhani, which played an effective role in attracting the votes of a large part of the religious people to him as well as the votes cast by the ordinary people in villages and small towns. There were also many other, less significant factors at work.

2. Mr. Rouhani never crossed any of the Islamic establishment’s red lines throughout his election campaign and in none of his public speeches in order to win more votes. He clearly proved that although he was dissatisfied with some existing policies and procedures, he would do his best to calm down his audience when part of that audience shouted slogans about the events which followed the previous presidential election in 2009. In the meantime, the logic he used to defend the nuclear policies which he pursued when heading Iran’s nuclear negotiating team was totally documented. Even after winning the poll, he urged his supporters not to pour into the streets to celebrate his victory without obtaining necessary permits from legal authorities. This, certainly, has been a very important effort to draw the attention of the Leader of the Islamic Revolution who, throughout the past months, had put regular emphasis on the need for candidates to abide by the law. By the way, let’s not forget that Mr. Rouhani is actually one of the two people who represent the Leader at the Supreme National Security Council, which is the highest ranking Iranian institution in charge of making decisions on matters of national security. Mr. Saeed Jalili, the current secretary of the Council is the other representative of the Leader.

3. It would be a grave mistake to believe in a sharp dichotomy in the Iranian society, by dividing that society into two distinct parts calling one part the conservative camp with the Leader, the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps, the security institutions, the Guardian Council, and similar bodies in it, and considering the other part the reformist camp, consisting of all the reform-minded groups including all the opposition groups and all the people who have voted for Mr. Rouhani. Such a mindset would only lead to the repetition of the same mistake which the Western media have persistently made when analyzing the Iranian society during the past years. In my opinion, neither the Iranian society, nor any other society in the world could be considered to be so distinctively divided in such a black-and-white manner. The ideas of Messrs. Rouhani, Qalibaf, Rezaei, Jalili, Velayati, and even Gharazi – who has apparently won the smallest share of the votes – have their own special influence and supporters in each and every layer of the Iranian society as well as the government structure. As before, some analysts believed that the votes cast by people in villages and small towns would be directed toward such candidates as Mr. Jalili (due to his special views and approaches), or Mr. Qalibaf (because of his vast and organized campaign). However, during the early hours after the vote counting began – when the vote count for villages and small towns becomes known first – the votes won by Mr. Rouhani rose at an unprecedented pace.

4. At present, Iran has reached a turning point in its history. The next government, backed by high votes and categorical support of people, will do its best to both solve the domestic problems and test its viewpoints and approaches in the area of foreign policy. I hope that the neighboring countries, Europe, and the United States would be able to correctly understand the message of this election. As for the United States, it seems that the US Congress has apparently made ratcheting up sanctions against Iran, without attention to their impact on the attitude of the Iranian public opinion toward the United States, a regular item of its weekly agenda. I hope they would understand the message of the recent election better than the others.